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COMMENTS
PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN RAISING A CONSTITUTIONAL
TAKING CLAIM: TRENDS IN FLORIDA LAW
ROBERT P. BANKS
I. INTRODUCTION
The criteria by which a development regulation can be analyzed
to determine if the regulation as applied to a particular property
results in a taking in violation of the United States Constitution'
and Florida Constitution2 were set out in Graham v. Estuary
Properties, Inc.' However, Estuary Properties did not definitively
settle the procedural issues concerning when and in what forum a
constitutional taking claim may be raised.
Subsequent to Estuary Properties the Florida courts have dealt
with these procedural issues in a series of cases." In 1978, the Flor-
ida legislature created a circuit court cause of action for property
owners seeking to raise a taking claim following final action by the
appropriate state agency with regard to the issuance of permits.5
This comment will compare the procedural standards established
by the Florida Supreme Court in cases where the taking claim oc-
curred prior to the creation of the 1978 statutory taking remedy 6
with case law which has interpreted the 1978 statute.7 This com-
1. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law .... " Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
2. "No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compen-
sation therefore paid to each owner." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
3. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
4. Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1984); Albrecht v.
State, 444 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1984); Key Haven Assoc'd Enters., Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 427
So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1982); Bowen v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 448 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA),
cert. granted, Fla. S. Ct. No. 65,264 (1984); State v. Atlantic Int'l Inv. Corp., 438 So. 2d 868
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983), cert. granted, Fla. S. Ct. No. 64,551 (1984); Griffin v. St. Johns Water
Mgmt. Dist., 409 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
5. Ch. 78-85, 1978 Fla. Laws 124 (currently codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 161.212, 253.763,
373.617, 380.085, and 403.90 (1983)).
6. Albrecht v. State, 444 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1984); Key Haven Assoc'd Enters., Inc. v. Board
of Trustees, 427 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1982).
7. Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1984); Bowen v.
Department of Envtl. Reg., 448 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. granted, Fla. S. Ct. No.
65,264 (1984); Griffin v. St. Johns Water Mgmt. Dist., 409 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
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ment will then endeavor to assess the status of taking law in Flor-
ida and will highlight areas of conflict in the case law.
II. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
SUBSTANTIVE TAKING CRITERIA
In Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., the Florida Supreme
Court listed the criteria to be used in determining "when the valid
exercise of the police power stops and an impermissible encroach-
ment on private property rights begins." The criteria are:
1. Whether there is a physical invasion of the property.
2. The degree to which there is a diminution in value of the
property. Or stated another way, whether the regulation pre-
cludes all economically reasonable use of the property.
3. Whether the regulation confers a public benefit or prevents a
public harm.
4. Whether the regulation promotes the health, safety, welfare,
or morals of the public.
5. Whether the regulation is arbitrarily and capriciously
applied.
6. The extent to which the regulation curtails investment-
backed expectations.'
The court used a two-step analysis in Estuary Properties to de-
termine whether a taking had occurred. 10 First, the court deter-
mined if the regulation as implemented was a valid exercise of po-
lice power.1 Second, the court considered whether the valid
exercise of the police power had placed so great a burden on the
property as to require the exercise of eminent domain. 2
8. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380-81 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981).
9. Id. For an analysis of Estuary Properties see Note, Environmental Law: Doing the
Two-Step Through the Mangroves To Preserve the Status Quo, 11 STETSON L. REV. 348
(1982). See also Comment, Environmental Law: Wetlands Regulation Prevents Harm, 33
U. FLA. L. REV. 615 (1981).
10. Note, supra note 9, at 355. The author classifies the two-step analysis as follows:
Step one is a police power analysis, which includes criteria three, four, and five; step two is
an eminent domain analysis, which considers criteria two and six. The two-step analysis
does not include criterion one, "whether there is a physical taking of the property." The
United States Supreme Court recently held in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), that permanent physical occupation always results in a taking.
Because physical invasion or occupation always results in a taking, if criterion one is satis-
fied there is no need to go through the two-step analysis.
11. Note, supra note 9, at 355.
12. Id.
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Florida courts have followed the Estuary Properties court's ap-
proach to taking analysis in subsequent cases.13 In contrast, the
procedural sequence followed in Estuary Properties to raise the
taking claim has not been uniformly adopted.
While the Florida Supreme Court in Key Haven Associated En-
terprises v. Board of Trustees ratified the process followed in Es-
tuary Properties as a proper method to raise a constitutional tak-
ing claim,1" it outlined alternative procedures to raise taking claims
based on the actions of state agencies in the permitting process.
These alternative procedures have been interpreted by the Florida
courts in several subsequent taking cases.1"
The constitutional taking claim in Estuary Properties was raised
in a district court review of a State Land and Water Adjudicatory
Commission denial of an application for development approval. 6
In 1975, Estuary applied to the Board of Commissioners of Lee
County for approval of a development of regional impact pursuant
to section 380.06, Florida Statutes.17 After a public hearing and a
recommendation for denial of the project by the Southwest Florida
Regional Planning Council, the Lee County Commission held pub-
lic hearings and denied the request to build a 26,500 unit develop-
ment which would destroy 1,800 acres of mangroves. 18 The board
then denied the application for development approval, citing the
findings of the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council that
the project would result in severe environmental impacts. 19 In-
cluded in the denial was a list of recommended changes which
would be necessary to gain approval of the project, including a re-
duction in the size of the project from 26,500 to 12,968 units and
the elimination of the destruction of such large acreages of
mangroves.20
Estuary appealed the denial of the development order to the
Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission.21 After a five
day de novo hearing, a hearing officer recommended that the ap-
13. Albrecht v. State, 444 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1984); Key Haven Assoc'd Enters., Inc. v. Board
of Trustees, 427 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1982); Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council,
442 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
14. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 159.
15. Bowen, 448 So. 2d at 568-69; Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 12.
16. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1376.
17. (Supp. 1974).
18. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1376.
19. Id. at 1376-77.
20. Id. at 1377.
21. Id.
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peal be denied, citing adverse environmental impacts and declining
to consider the taking issue "because that issue was determined to
be a judicial question beyond the purview of the administrative
hearing. 2
2
The Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission adopted the
hearing officer's recommendation and entered a final order of de-
nial.2s Estuary sought judicial review of the commission's denial of
the project.2' The First District Court of Appeal found that the
denial of the application for development approval resulted in a
taking and remanded the case to the commission for approval un-
less Lee County commenced condemnation proceedings for all salt-
water mangroves.25 Subsequently, the supreme court reversed the
finding of a taking without questioning the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court of appeal to consider the constitutional question.26
The Estuary Properties procedural process of raising a taking
claim against the state can be summarized as follows: after a denial
of a state permit and an exhaustion of administrative remedies, the
constitutional taking claim may be raised along with other issues
in a district court proceeding.
III. THE PROCEDURAL TAKING CLAIM PROCESS REFINED: Key
Haven, Albrecht AND Atlantic International
A. Key Haven
In Key Haven Associated Enterprises v. Board of Trustees,27
the Florida Supreme Court was provided the opportunity to clarify
the procedural requirements for raising a taking claim based on
state action resulting in a permit denial. The issues which the
court dealt with in Key Haven were the choice of court forums and
the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies, both of
which are issues evolving out of provisions in the Florida Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.28 The Act provides for all final agency ac-
tion of state agencies to be subject to review in district courts of
22. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). For a
contrary view held by another hearing officer, see Peterson v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 35
FDOAH 77 (1977).
23. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1377.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1377-83.
27. 427 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1982).
28. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1983).
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appeal.2 9 The issues to be considered in district court review of
agency action include constitutional issues.30 The Act also provides
for the continuing ability of circuit courts to issue declaratory
judgments.'
Between 1964 and 1968, Key Haven purchased 185 acres of sub-
merged land in the Florida Keys from the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund.2 In 1972, Key Haven sought a permit to
dredge and fill a portion of the submerged land.3  In 1976, the De-
partment of Environmental Regulation (DER) notified Key Haven
of its intention to deny the permit.34 Key Haven requested and
received a formal hearing on the permit application as authorized
by section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. 5 After public hearings, a
hearing officer recommended denial of the permit, finding Key Ha-
ven did not meet the requirements of chapters 253 and 403, Flor-
ida Statutes.36 DER proceeded to deny the permit.3 7
Key Haven chose not to pursue an administrative appeal of
DER's action to the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund as provided in section 253.76, Florida Statutes. 8 Instead,
Key Haven chose to raise a constitutional taking claim in circuit
court.39 The trial court dismissed the action based on Coulter v.
Davin4" and Kasser v. Dade County.,"
In Coulter, the Second District Court of Appeal held that a
party seeking to overturn an agency action based on the unconsti-
tutionality of that action is barred from raising constitutional chal-
lenges in circuit court that could have been raised in a district
court action pursuant to section 120.68 of the Florida Administra-
tive Procedure Act.4" Coulter held, however, that a party is not
foreclosed from challenging the underlying constitutionality of a
29. Id. § 120.68(2).
30. Id. § 120.68(12)(c).
31. Id. § 120.73.
32. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 155.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. (1975).
36. (1975).
37. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 155.
38. (1975). The statute provided that the governor and cabinet sitting as the Board of
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund shall hear and decide appeals made from
department decisions. FLA. STAT. ch. 253 (1975); Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 155.
39. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 155.
40. 373 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
41. 344 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
42. Coulter, 373 So. 2d at 425-28.
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statute in circuit court.43
In Kasser, the Third District Court of Appeal held that a plain-
tiff could not simultaneously assert that a rezoning was a valid ex-
ercise of the police powers while at the same time claiming that it
constituted an illegal taking.
44
The district court in Key Haven agreed with the trial court's
finding that both Key Haven and Coulter "were attempts to collat-
erally attack the particular agency's denial of a permit. ' 45 It also
agreed with the trial court's comparison of Key Haven to Kasser,
finding that in both cases the party claimed an agency action was
valid while simultaneously alleging that the action was
unconstitutional.4 6
The district court provided a discussion of the judicial policy of
exhaustion of remedies and gleaned the following principles from
Florida case law:
1. All review processes available under chapter 120 must be ex-
hausted before the judicial branch will consider intervention.47
2. Circuit courts should only overrule agency action in ex-
traordinary situations, such as "when the constitutional legiti-
macy of the entire administrative inquiry is questioned.
48
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the district
court opinion holding that the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies precluded a circuit court challenge.49 However, the su-
preme court reversed that part of the opinion which held that Key
Haven was required to raise its constitutional claim in district
court.50
The supreme court held that after administrative remedies in
the executive branch are exhausted, an applicant is free to: (1) con-
test the agency action in district court, raising all issues (including
constitutional issues); or (2) accept the agency action as completely
correct and file an action in circuit court alleging an illegal tak-
ing." The court analyzed the types of constitutional challenges
43. Id. at 428.
44. Kasser, 344 So. 2d at 929.
45. Key Haven Assoc'd Enters., Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 400 So. 2d 66, 68 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1981).
46. Id. at 69.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 160.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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that can be raised in the administrative process and the role of the
district and circuit courts in considering the challenges. The court
found three categories of constitutional challenges:
1. Challenges to the facial constitutionality of a statute;
2. Facial challenges to an agency rule adopted pursuant to a
constitutional provision or statute; or
3. The unconstitutionality of an agency's action in implement-
ing an otherwise constitutional rule.2
The court found that a facial challenge to the constitutionality
of a statute can be raised in circuit court without the prior exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies.5" The facial constitutionality of a
statute can also be raised on direct appeal in the district court."4
The raising of the constitutionality of a statute on direct review
was described by the court as "a process that would allow all issues
to be decided in the least expensive and time-consuming man-
ner."55 The court further held that facial constitutionality of an
agency rule should always be raised on direct appeal pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act.56 The district court can remand
the rule back to the agency, and if the agency refuses to modify the
rule the district court can declare the rule unconstitutional.
Challenges to the constitutionality of ordinances as applied
should not be permitted, the court held, until administrative reme-
dies are exhausted. The court stated that district courts are the
appropriate forum for such challenges "because those courts have
the power to declare the agency action improper and to require
any modifications in the administrative decision-making process
necessary to render the final agency order constitutional. ' 58 The
court found, however, that:
[DIirect review in the district court of the agency action may be
52. Id. at 157. But see State Comm'n on Ethics v. Sullivan, 430 So. 2d 928, 941-45 (Fla.
1st DCA 1983) (Shaw, J., concurring).
53. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 156-57 (citing Gulf Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oakland
Memorial Park, Inc., 361 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1978)).
54. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 157.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 158 (citing Rice v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 386 So. 2d
844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)). In Rice, the district court remand of an appeal of an agency
decision back to the agency resulted in modification of the rule without the need for the
court to find the rule unconstitutional.
57. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 158.
58. Id.
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eliminated and proceedings properly commenced in circuit court,
if the aggrieved party is willing to accept all actions by the execu-
tive branch as correct both as to the constitutionality of the stat-
ute implemented and as to the propriety of the agency
proceedings.59
The court then rejected the district court's application of zoning
law to the state permitting process:
A zoning ordinance is, by definition, invalid if it is confisca-
tory. . . .We agree with the court in Kasser, which correctly held
that an assertion that a denial of rezoning is confiscatory consti-
tutes a direct attack on the validity of a zoning ordinance. This is
not the case when a statute authorizes a permit denial which is
confiscatory. As we stated in Graham v. Estuary Properties, "it
may be . . .that a regulation complies with standards required
for the police power but still results in a taking.""0
Examining the instant case, the court found that Key Haven's
failure to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing the permit
denial to the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund
precluded any constitutional challenge to the agency action." If
the administrative remedies had been exhausted, Key Haven could
have chosen to pursue an Estuary Properties style challenge in the
district court or a circuit court challenge to the constitutionality,
but not the propriety, of the agency action.
There is a suggestion in Key Haven that a circuit court challenge
to the constitutionality of an agency action may not utilize all six
taking criteria as established in Estuary Properties.6 2 Key Haven's
establishment of different taking criteria at the circuit and district
courts emphasizes the nature of the Estuary Properties taking
analysis as a two step process involving analysis of (1) the validity
of the exercise of police power; and (2) eminent domain." After
Key Haven, if there were a challenge in district court, the court
could consider a taking claim using both police powers and emi-
59. Id. at 159.
60. Id. (quoting Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1381) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 160.
63. Id.; see also Fernandez & Bryant, Key Haven and Its Progeny: Uncertain Choices
for Constitutional Challenges to Administrative Action, 58 FLA. B.J. 381 (1984) (suggesting
that Key Haven eliminates criteria four and five of the Estuary Properties analysis in cir-
cuit court taking actions).
FLORIDA TAKING LAW
nent domain analysis, while a taking action in circuit court would
be limited to eminent domain analysis.
B. Albrecht
In Albrecht v. State64 the Florida Supreme Court was faced with
the question of whether a party raising a district court challenge to
final agency action must raise a taking claim, or whether the con-
stitutional claims can be held in abeyance and raised in circuit
court if the district court upholds the administrative action. The
Second District Court of Appeal, which had found that res judicata
prevented the raising of constitutional claims in circuit court after
a district court had upheld the administrative action, was reversed
by the supreme court.6 It held that a party challenging an admin-
istrative action can choose to raise constitutional claims along with
administrative claims in a section 120.68 appeal or can choose to
raise a circuit court taking challenge after the disposition of the
district court administrative challenge."6
The applicants in Albrecht were the owners of coastal property
who had purchased 300 feet of submerged land from the State of
Florida. 7 They applied for and received a permit to fill the land
from Pinellas County, subject to approval by the State of Florida.
When the permit was denied by DER, the applicants unsuccess-
fully appealed to the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund. 8
The applicants pursued judicial review of the permit denial pur-
suant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, 9 by challenging the con-
stitutionality of section 253.124, Florida Statutes70 and the author-
ity of DER to review county findings.7 1 The First District Court of
Appeal upheld the permit denial, finding that DER had authority
to review county commission findings, and upheld the constitution-
ality of the standards provided in chapter 253.2
The applicants subsequently filed suit in Pinellas County Circuit
Court seeking compensation for the taking of their property." The
64. 444 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1984).
65. Albrecht v. State, 407 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
66. Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 12-13.
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id.
69. (1975).
70. (1973).
71. Albrecht v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 353 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
72. Id. at 885-86.
73. Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 10.
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circuit court dismissed the action based on the holding in Coulter
that when an administrative action has become final, with or with-
out district court review, a party is precluded from making a con-
stitutional attack on the proceeding in circuit court.7
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal
based on Coulter and principles of res judicata. 5 The court noted
that the appellants had the opportunity to raise the taking claim
in their earlier district court appeal and stated that "[t]he fact that
they did not raise [the taking claim] is irrelevant to the application
of res judicata. ' '7 6
The supreme court, however, rejected the application of Coulter
and res judicata to Albrecht and held that res judicata did not pre-
vent raising a taking claim in circuit court subsequent to district
court disposition of the action.7 The supreme court expressly re-
jected the holding in Coulter that the doctrine of res judicata fore-
closes circuit court review of constitutional issues which could have
been raised in the district court review of an action. 8
The court then found that the legislature, in providing a means
to raise constitutional claims in section 120.68(12), Florida Stat-
utes,7 9 did not mandate that such claims be brought there:
We do not believe that was the legislature's intention. It is too
broad a leap to take the words of a statute which provide for re-
mand if the action is found to be in violation of the constitution
and interpret them to mean that any constitutional issue must be
raised there or be forever barred.80
Citing several previous Florida res judicata cases," the court
concluded:
It is . . .a settled rule that when the second suit is between the
same parties, but based upon a different cause of action from the
first, the prior judgment will not serve as an estoppel except as to
those issues actually litigated and determined in it. . . .The de-
74. Albrecht, 407 So. 2d at 211 (citing Coulter v. Davin, 373 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979)).
75. Albrecht, 407 So. 2d at 211.
76. Id.
77. Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 11.
78. Id.
79. (1981).
80. Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 11 (emphasis in original).
81. Donahue v. Davis, 68 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1953); Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
1952); Prall v. Prall, 50 So. 867 (Fla. 1909); Lake v. Hancock, 20 So. 811 (Fla. 1896).
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termining factor in deciding whether the cause of action is the
same is whether the facts or evidence necessary to maintain the
suit are the same in both actions.2
The court then found that the cause of action in the First District
Court action differed from the cause of action in the subsequent
circuit court taking claim." The court also noted that facts neces-
sary to challenge the propriety of the agency action differed from
the facts necessary to demonstrate a taking. 4
While the Florida Supreme Court's application of res judicata
principles is consistent with Florida precedent, it is an anachronis-
tic approach, reflecting law that predates modern rules of civil pro-
cedure and pleadings.The current Florida approach to res judicata
allows parties challenging administrative challenges to forum shop,
challenging the action in the district court where the state agency
is located85 and, if unsuccessful there, to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the action in the circuit where the property subject to
the permit application is located."6 As Judge Robert Smith of the
First District Court of Appeal stated in Rice v. Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Services: "[W]e think there is precious
little sound policy to justify dividing an administrative controversy
into nonconstitutional issues and . . . constitutional issues and
parceling them out to separate agency and circuit court litigations
which may eventually merge again in the same district court of ap-
peal or, worse, in different district courts. 8 7
The precise problems which Judge Smith wrote about in Rice
occurred in Albrecht, where the district court appeal challenging
the agency action was heard in the First District Court of Apeal,88
while the subsequent appeal of the circuit court taking challenge
occurred in the Second District Court of Appeal."
A more efficient approach to res judicata is provided in section
24, Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which provides:
82. Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 12.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Proceedings in district court challenging the actions of an agency are instituted in
the district court "where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides."
FLA. STAT. § 120.68(2) (1983).
86. Id. § 253.763(2) provides that circuit court action shall be filed "in the circuit court
in the judicial circuit in which the affected property is located .... "
87. Rice v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 386 So. 2d 844, 848 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1980).
88. Albrecht v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 353 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
89. Albrecht, 407 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
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(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action ex-
tinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or
bar . . . the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff
to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part
of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of
which the transaction arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction," and
what grouping constitutes a "series" are to be determined
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether
the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether
they form a convenient trial unit . . ..
The Restatement's approach to res judicata is based on the
modern system of pleadings as evidenced by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. While Florida has had a system of pleading based
on the federal rules since 1950 and eliminated all distinctions be-
tween common law and equity pleadings in 1967,1 the principles
of res judicata used by the Florida Supreme Court are gleaned
from relatively archaic law.92
If the res judicata analysis of Albrecht is performed using the
transactional approach of the Restatement, it becomes clear that
the various causes of action raised in the district court and the
circuit court evolved out of the same "transaction." As all rights
evolving out of a transaction are extinguished pursuant to the rules
of bar or merger, the 1977 district court ruling upholding agency
action9" would have barred subsequent circuit court action.
The process laid out by the supreme court in Albrecht and Key
Haven to raise the constitutional taking issue when challenging
state action can be summarized as follows:
1. Exhaust administrative remedies available in the executive
branch and appeal the agency decision in district court, including
the constitutional claim;94 or
2. Accept the agency action as correct and institute immediate
circuit court action raising the taking claim;9" or
3. Raise the taking claim in circuit court after the propriety of
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1980); see also Nevada v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 2906, 2918-20 (1983).
91. H. TRAWICK, FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE V-Vii (1981).
92. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
93. Albrecht v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 353 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
94. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 60.
95. Id.
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the agency action has been determined in district court.9 6
C. Atlantic International
The First District Court of Appeal applied Key Haven principles
in State v. Atlantic International Development Corp.,97 reversing
a circuit court decision which had found a taking.
In Atlantic International, the developer of a speculative subdi-
vision filed a circuit court taking claim after entering a consent
agreement and settlement stipulation which "'resolve[d] or
rendere[d] moot all issues' " raised in the district court action filed
after permit denial by DER." The circuit court found that the cu-
mulative effects of the actions of various state agencies resulted in
a taking and ordered the state to commence eminent domain pro-
ceedings." The state appealed the circuit court ruling. 100 In this
second appeal, the district court held Atlantic was precluded by
Key Haven from proceeding with an alternate remedy in circuit
court: "By contesting the validity of DER's denial of the permit in
a petition for writ of certiorari Atlantic elected the district court as
the judicial forum and was thereby foreclosed from proceeding
with an alternate remedy in circuit court."' 1
The Atlantic decision was written prior to publication of the su-
preme court's decision in Albrecht, which allowed a taking claim to
be raised in circuit court after the propriety of an action is deter-
mined in district court. 10 2 Albrecht does not, however, allow an
agency action to be relitigated in circuit court after a district court
has ratified the action: "[O]nce a party agrees to the propriety of
the action and chooses the circuit court forum, it is estopped from
any further denial that the action itself was proper."' 03 If the dis-
trict court in Atlantic International interpreted Key Haven as
foreclosing circuit court taking actions, its interpretation has
96. Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 12.
97. 438 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), cert. granted, Fla. S. Ct. No. 64,551 (1984).
98. Id. at 870 (quoting the parties' joint motion for the court's approval of a stipulation
and consent agreement).
99. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment on "Taking" Issues, At-
lantic Int'l Inv. Corp. v. Department of Business Reg., No. 75,295 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. June 2,
1982).
100. Atlantic Int'l, 438 So. 2d at 868.
101. Id. at 871.
102. Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 12-13.
103. Id. at 13.
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clearly been overturned by Albrecht.10 However, if the court is re-
ferring to a prohibition against attacks on the propriety of agency
action in circuit court, its holding is consistent with Key Haven
and Albrecht.10 5
The taking analysis performed by the circuit court in Atlantic
International was not limited to eminent domain analysis, but in-
volved all six of the Estuary Properties taking criteria.106 The
Florida Supreme Court has the opportunity in its review of Atlan-
tic International to clarify the criteria by which a taking action
can be judged in circuit court. In addition, the court is faced with
its first review of circuit and district court opinions applying an
Estuary Properties taking analysis.
IV. A STATUTORY TAKING REMEDY: CHAPTER 78-85, LAWS OF
FLORIDA
In 1978 the legislature created a statutory taking remedy in cir-
cuit court when it adopted chapter 78-85, Laws of Florida.' The
Act can be traced to proposals of the Governor's Property Rights
Study Commission of 1975,108 which proposed the creation of a sys-
tem whereby compensation would be paid for a regulation that
"unduly diminishes the value of property even though it does not
constitute an unconstitutional taking without compensation.' ' 09
Taking remedies fall into two general classifications: (1) compen-
104. Petitioners' Initial Brief on the Merits at 36-39, Atlantic Int'l Inv. Corp. v. State,
Fla. S. Ct. No. 64,551. Petitioner argues in its brief that the district court opinion clearly
conflicts with the supreme court finding in Albrecht.
105. Answer Brief of Respondent at 2-11, Atlantic Int'l Inv. Corp. v. Florida, Fla. S. Ct.
No. 64,551. The respondent in Atlantic Int'l argues that Atlantic International never ac-
cepted the propriety of state permitting actions, as required in Albrecht, prior to proceeding
with the circuit court taking action. "Atlantic ventured where Key Haven explicitly held an
aggrieved party in circuit court could not go: a claim of taking based on a challenge to the
propriety of the state's actions." Id. at 7.
106. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment on "Taking" Issues at
33-41, Atlantic Int'l Inv. Corp. v. Department of Business Reg., No. 75,295 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct.
June 2, 1982).
107. Ch. 78-85, 1978 Fla. Laws 124 (currently codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 161.212, 253.763,
373.617, 380.085, and 403.90 (1983)). For an analysis and description of ch. 78-85, see
Rhodes, Compensating Police Power Takings: Chapter 78-85, Laws of Florida, 52 FLA. B.J.
741 (1978). See also Cookston & Bruton, Zoning Law, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 581, 633-37
(1981).
108. Rhodes, supra note 107, at 742.
109. Final Report of the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission (Mar. 17, 1975)
(available at Florida Legislative Library, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.). For a discussion of
the proposals of the Property Rights Study Commission, see Haigler, McInerny & Rhodes,
The Legislature's Role in the Taking Issue, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1 (1976); see also Note,
Updating Eminent Domain for Environmental Control, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 24 (1976).
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sable regulations which, like the proposal of the Governor's Prop-
erty Rights Commission of 1975, require compensation for nontak-
ings that result in a substantial diminution of property value;11
and (2) the American Law Institute (ALI) approach allowing gov-
ernments to modify, invalidate, or pay compensation if a court de-
termines that a regulation is an unconstitutional taking."' The
Florida approach adopted in chapter 78-85 is based on the ALI
approach, but differs in that the ALI approach applies to all devel-
opment regulations while the Florida approach applies to the state
permitting process but excludes local zoning." 2
Chapter 78-85 allows persons affected by the state permitting
process involving chapters 161, 253, 373, 380, and 403 to raise a
constitutional taking claim within ninety days of final agency ac-
tion regarding the permit."' The state programs affected by this
cause of action include the coastal construction program of the De-
partment of Natural Resources, the state lands program of the
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, Land and Water Ad-
judicatory Commission decisions regarding developments of re-
gional impact and critical areas, Land and Water Adjudicatory
Commission and Regional Water Management districts' actions in-
volving water permits, and Department of Environmental Regula-
tion permits regarding pollution control.' The adoption of the
Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984 as an addi-
tion to chapter 403 added wetlands permitting to the program ar-
eas subject to taking actions under chapter 78-85."1
The circuit court cause of action is "confined solely to determin-
ing whether final agency action is an unreasonable exercise of the
state police power constituting a taking without just compensa-
110. See D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE
AND COMPENSATION 256-307 (1978) for a spirited argument in favor of compensable regula-
tions for nontakings.
111. MODEL LAND DEv. CODE § 9-112(3) (1975).
112. Rhodes, supra note 107, at 743; Cookston & Bruton, supra note 107, at 635. The
Florida Supreme Court in Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213, 216
(Fla. 1984), cited Rhodes when it interpreted ch. 78-85 as excluding local zoning regulations.
113. Chapter 78-85, § 2, 1978 Fla. Laws 124, 124 (currently codified at FLA. STAT. §
161.212(2), 253.763(2), 373.617(2), 380.085(2), and 403.90(2) (1983)).
114. Rhodes, supra note 107, at 743.
115. Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984, ch. 84-79, 1984 Fla. Laws
202 (currently codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 403.901-.915 (Supp. 1984)). The Act contains no
reference to FLA. STAT. § 403.90 (1983) and provides in § 403.909 that final agency action
shall be reviewed pursuant to ch. 120. The inclusion of the Wetlands Act within ch. 403
brings it under the requirements of the statutory taking remedy contained in § 403.90.
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tion."1 16 The statute does not modify the jurisdiction of chapter
120 to provide review of the propriety of final agency action.11 7
If a circuit court finds a state agency action constitutes a taking
without just compensation, the statute provides for remand to the
agency, which shall agree within a reasonable time to do one of the
following:
(1) issue the permit;
(2) agree to pay monetary damages; or
(3) modify the agency action to eliminate the taking."'
The agency shall submit an agreed upon action to the circuit
court within ninety days of the circuit court ruling.1 If the agency
fails to submit a proposed order or if the court finds the order un-
reasonable, the court may order the agency to perform any of the
three alternatives listed in the Act. 20Chapter 78-85 muddles the procedural taking requirements set
out by the supreme court in Albrecht and Key Haven. While both
Albrecht and Key Haven acknowledge the statute as codified, the
court did not base its rulings on the statute because that legisla-
tion was codified subsequent to the permit denials challenged in
the cases.1 21
The Florida courts have interpreted the statute in several deci-
sions after the enactment of chapter 78-85.121 In Dade County v.
National Bulk Carriers, Inc., the Florida Supreme Court held that
a local zoning decision was not subject to the procedural process
created in the statute. 2 3 In Griffin v. St. Johns Water Manage-
116. Chapter 78-85, § 2, 1978 Fla. Laws 124, 124 (currently codified at FLA. STAT. §§
161.212(2), 253.763(2), 373.617(2), 380.085(2), and 403.90(2) (1983)).
117. Id.
118. Chapter 78-85, § 3, 1978 Fla. Laws 124, 124 (currently codified at FLA. STAT. §§
161.212(3)(a)-(c), 253.763(3)(a)-(c), 373.617(3)(a)-(c), 380.085(3)(a)-(c), and 403.90(3)(a)-(c)
(1983)).
119. Chapter 78-85, § 4, 1978 Fla. Laws 124, 124-25 (currently codified at FLA. STAT. §§
161.212(4), 253.763(4), 373.617(4), 380.085(4), and 403.90(4) (1983)).
120. Id.
121. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 160: "We find that this procedure exists independent of
the specific statutory authority now found in section 253.763(2), Florida Statutes, (1979),
which became effective . . . after Key Haven filed suit in the circuit court in this case." The
Albrecht court noted "the subsequent enactment of section 253.763, Florida Statutes
(Supp.1978)." Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 11.
122. Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1984); Bowen v.
Department of Envtl. Reg., 448 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. granted, Fla. S. Ct. No.
65,264 (1984); Griffin v. St. John's Water Mgmt. Dist., 409 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
123. National Bulk Carriers, 450 So. 2d at 216.
FLORIDA TAKING LAW
ment District, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that appeal
of a final agency action to the State Land and Water Adjudicatory
Commission delayed the final agency action required for a circuit
court taking action.1"4 In Bowen v. Department of Environmental
Regulation, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the ex-
haustion requirement established by the supreme court in Key Ha-
ven does not apply in circuit court taking actions which are based
on the statutory remedy provided in chapter 78-85.115 After Bowen,
it becomes unclear what, if anything, is left of the supreme court's
holdings in Key Haven and Albrecht.
V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CHAPTER 78-85, LAWS OF FLORIDA
A. National Bulk Carriers
The Florida Supreme Court held that zoning cannot simultane-
ously be both valid and confiscatory in Dade County v. National
Bulk Carriers, Inc.12 6 The only remedy for invalid zoning is to re-
peal the invalid ordinance. 2 7 In addition, the court held that sec-
tion 373.617, Florida Statutes, does not apply to the local zoning
process. 128
In 1975 Dade County designated 1,850 acres of industrially
zoned land owned by National Bulk Carriers as "environmentally
sensitive" in the County Comprehensive Master Plan. 129 The
county subsequently rezoned the property from "industrial" to
"interim use," while denying a request from the landowners to ap-
prove an unusual use application to dredge and fill a portion of the
property to make it suitable for farming. 130 National Bulk Carriers
challenged the denial and the rezoning in circuit court, claiming a
taking without compensation. 131 The circuit court upheld the
county's action, but indicated that National Bulk Carriers had the
right to raise a separate circuit court taking action. 213 The district
court of appeal remanded the case to circuit court, finding that the
circuit court must determine the taking issue pursuant to section
124. Griffin, 409 So. 2d at 210.
125. Bowen, 448 So. 2d at 568-69.
126. 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1984).
127. Id. at 216.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 214.
130. Id. at 214-15.
131. Id. at 215.
132. Id. at 216.
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373.617, Florida Statutes.' ss The Florida Supreme Court, citing the
limited scope of chapter 78-85, remanded the case to the circuit
court for a determination of whether the zoning resulted in a tak-
ing and therefore should be invalidated.1 34
In holding that the proper remedy for invalid zoning is repeal of
the invalid ordinance, the court reiterated the distinction between
confiscatory zoning and confiscatory state permitting:
[I]f the "statute authorizes a permit denial which is confiscatory,"
... a separate condemnation proceeding is an appropriate rem-
edy. Under the type of statutory permitting-scheme involved in
Key Haven, Albrecht and Graham v. Estuary, it was contem-
plated that its application may result in a taking. Such is not the
case in the application of a zoning ordinance. To be valid, it must
be reasonable. If a zoning ordinance is confiscatory, the relief
available is a judicial determination that the ordinance is unen-
forceable and must be stricken." 5
Why did the supreme court make a distinction in the remedies
available to challenge the exercise of police powers by the state in
the permitting process as compared to their exercise by local gov-
ernments in the zoning process? Ironically, Robert Rhodes, in an
article cited by the court to interpret section 373.617, had ques-
tioned the validity of such a distinction.3 6 The string of cites the
supreme court provided in National Bulk Carriers in support of
the proposition that the only remedy for confiscatory zoning is in-
validation, offered little more than a mere restatement of the
rule. 137
The easiest way to distinguish the difference in remedies be-
tween local zoning and state permitting is to note, as the supreme
133. (1981).
134. National Bulk Carriers, 450 So. 2d at 216.
135. Id. (quoting Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 159).
136. Rhodes, supra note 107, at 741. Rhodes questioned the "clear distinction" described
by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So.
2d 614, 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), cert. denied, 293 So. 2d 917 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1975).
137. National Bulk Carriers, 450 So. 2d at 216; Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 159 ("[A]n
assertion that a denial of rezoning is confiscatory constitutes a direct attack on the validity
of a zoning ordinance. This is not the case when a statute authorizes a permit denial which
is confiscatory."). See also Kasser v. Dade County, 344 So. 2d 928, 929 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
("We cannot allow the appellant to assert that the denial of rezoning was reasonable while
simultaneously alleging that it was confiscatory."); Mailman Dev. Corp., 286 So. 2d at 615
("We hold that enactment of a zoning ordinance.., does not entitle the property owner to
seek compensation for the taking of the property .... ").
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court did in National Bulk Carriers, that the legislature chose not
to provide a taking remedy for zoning when adopting chapter 78-
85.138 However, in Key Haven the court found that the taking
cause of action exists "independent of the specific statutory au-
thority now found in section 253.763(2), Florida Statutes. ' 139 Given
the court's apparent steadfast devotion to the invalidation rule, it
is unclear if the court will abandon the rule absent specific statu-
tory direction.
One rationale to distinguish remedies available in zoning from
those available in the state permitting process is to label zoning a
"first generation" regulation which applies "comprehensively to all
owners, who ultimately share the burden as well as the benefit of
regulation."' 40 In contrast, "second generation" land use restric-
tions focus on natural resource protection and are not aimed at
providing a minimum reasonable use of property."" One commen-
tator has questioned the distinction between compensation under
the new comprehensive land use regulations and no compensation
under old regulations, noting that "[i]maginatively used, the old
powers could be stretched to do almost everything that is possible
under the new powers.' 142
The most influential argument in favor of a taking remedy in
rezoning cases was presented by Justice Brennan in his dissent in
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, where he
stated that once a taking is established "the Constitution demands
that the government entity pay just compensation for the period
commencing on the date the government entity chooses to rescind
or otherwise amend the regulation.""11 3 If the United States Su-
preme Court chooses to adopt the position of Justice Brennan in
the future, the Florida Supreme Court would be forced to rethink
138. National Bulk Carriers, 450 So. 2d at 216.
139. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 160.
140. Rhodes, supra note 107, at 741.
141. Id.
142. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 110, at 298. See Comment, Just Compen-
sation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land
Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 711, 732-40 (1982), for an argument that the invalida-
tion remedy is inadequate and subject to abuse, placing landowners on a "merry-go-round"
of endless invalidation and litigation.
143. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). See Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole Equal the
Sum of Its Parts, 15 URB. LAW. 447 (1983), for a critique of Justice Brennan's dissent. See
also Pinellas County v. Brown, 420 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (rejecting an assertion
that the temporary denial of a building permit resulted in a taking).
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its position regarding taking and zoning.1 44
The distinction that best explains the difference in remedies
available for the local zoning and state permitting process is the
classification of local zoning as a legislative process and of the state
permitting process as an administrative process which is subject to
the Administrative Procedure Act. 45 As the state permit process
merges with the local zoning process, the distinctions between leg-
islative and administrative acts fade, as does the rationale for pro-
viding different remedies for state and local actions.
In Manatee County v. Estech General Chemical Corp.,'4 the
Second District Court of Appeal held that local zoning decisions
that are part of an order of a development of regional impact
(DRI) are subject to review by the Florida Land and Water Adju-
dicatory Commission. Under Estech, whether a local rezoning deci-
sion is subject to state review is determined by whether the rezon-
ing is large enough to meet the threshold of a DRI' 47 Thus if the
National Bulk Carriers' unusual use application had triggered a
DRI, the local zoning denial would have been subject to Florida
Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission review. Commission ac-
tion upholding the zoning denial would have permitted a circuit
court taking action pursuant to section 380.085, Florida
Statutes.'
4
B. Griffin
A Florida district court was provided with the first opportunity
to interpret chapter 78-85, Laws of Florida in Griffin v. St. Johns
River Water Management District.'49 After denial of an applica-
tion for a permit by the St. Johns River Water Management Dis-
144. In Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.),
cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 80 (1984), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. as the majority view of the Supreme Court on
taking in local land use regulation cases and awarded temporary damages of $350,000 for the
improper denial of a subdivision plat. The Supreme Court in Hamilton Bank has the oppor-
tunity to revisit San Diego Gas and end the uncertainty left after that 4-1-4 decision.
145. See 1 L. DAVIDSON & M. MAcCONNELL, FLORIDA ZONING LAW § 5.03 (1983).
146. 402 So. 2d 1251, 1253-56 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). But see Friends of the Everglades,
Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 9 Fla. L.W. 1636, 1638 (1st DCA July 25, 1984), where
Chief Judge Ervin criticized the Estech court's finding that the Florida Land and Water
Adjudicatory Commission can review zoning decisions involved in a DRI. This criticism was
omitted from the official opinion published at 456 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
147. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ch. 27F-2 (1982) provides threshold levels of developments pre-
sumed to be DRI's.
148. FLA. STAT. § 380.085 (1983).
149. 409 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
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trict, Griffin filed the following appeals:
(1) a district court action challenging the permit denial pursu-
ant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes;
(2) review of the action by the Florida Land and Water Adjudi-
catory Commission pursuant to section 373.114, Florida Statutes;
and
(3) a circuit court taking action pursuant to section 373.617,
Florida Statutes. 150
One month after filing his notice of appeal, Griffin sought to
abate the district court appeal pending the outcome of the circuit
court taking action.15 1 Ruling on the abatement motion, the dis-
trict court dismissed the chapter 120 appeal, found that the appeal
of the permit denial to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commis-
sion delayed the final agency action required for a district court
appeal, and stated: "Since the Commission may modify or rescind
the action of the Water Management District, it cannot be consid-
ered (as yet) 'final' agency action. ' 152
In dicta, the court approved of the simultaneous appeal process
followed by Griffin, interpreting section 373.617(2) as setting up "a
bifurcated appeal procedure, both avenues of which must be pur-
sued simultaneously because of the time deadlines.' 1 53
Because an appeal of final agency action to a district court may
result in a rescission or modification of the agency action, a circuit
court taking proceeding undertaken prior to the conclusion of ap-
pellate proceedings would probably be meaningless and at best
would be a highly speculative undertaking. A better method of in-
terpreting what constitutes final agency action under section
373.617 would be to adopt the position of the Florida Supreme
Court set forth in Albrecht and Key Haven, that "the propriety of
an agency action must be finally determined before a claim for in-
verse condemnation exists."' 54 It should be noted that the Griffin
court's interpretation of section 373.617 was made without the
150. Id. at 209.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 210.
153. Id. The interpretation that FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (1983) requires simultaneous
district court appeal and circuit court appeal is based on: (1) the 90-day deadline to seek
circuit court review of a final agency action established in the statute, and (2) the 30-day
deadline established in FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110(b) to seek district court review of final agency
action.
154. Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 12.
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benefit of the supreme court's opinions in Key Haven and
Albrecht.'55
C. Bowen
In Bowen v. Department of Environmental Regulation, the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal interpreted sections 253.763(2) and
403.90(2), Florida Statutes, as allowing a circuit court taking action
without exhaustion of administrative remedies. 5 The court found
that section 253.763(2) had altered the case law established by Key
Haven which required the exhaustion of administrative
remedies.1 57
Bowen applied for a dredge and fill permit pursuant to chapters
403 and 253.158 Bowen did not request an administrative hearing
under section 120.57, and DER issued a final order denying the
permit.159 Bowen subsequently filed a taking action in circuit
court.1 60 The trial court, applying Key Haven principles, found
that failure to request an administrative hearing pursuant to sec-
tion 120.57 prior to the final agency action denying the permit con-
stituted a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and barred
the circuit court taking action.'
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the circuit court
and remanded the case to allow the taking claim to be tried.' The
court based its decision on two grounds: (1) an interpretation of
the meaning of sections 253.763 and 403.90; and (2) a conclusion
that the procedure established by section 253.763 "is in accord
with the general policy against requiring exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies where administrative proceedings would be useless,
and where parties are willing to accept the final agency administra-
tive action as procedurally and substantively correct.' 6 3
The court's interpretation of section 253.763 was based on the
plain meaning of the statute: "Section 253.763 now only requires,
155. Griffin was issued by the Fifth District on February 3, 1982; the supreme court
decision in Key Haven was issued December 16, 1982; and the supreme court decision in
Albrecht was released on January 12, 1984.
156. Bowen v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 448 So. 2d 566, 568-69 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert.
granted, Fla. S. Ct. No. 65,264 (1984).
157. Id. at 568.
158. (1981).
159. Bowen, 448 So. 2d at 568.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 567-68.
162. Id. at 570.
163. Id. at 569.
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before resort to the circuit court, 'final action of any agency' and
not an appeal from 'final action of any agency.' "1164 The court con-
cluded that if the legislature had wanted to require appeal from
final agency action, it could have provided language to that
effect.165
The Bowen court's interpretation that section 253.763 does not
require exhaustion of administrative remedies is consistent with
commentaries which have discussed the statute.166 The court, how-
ever, ignored the fact that Florida courts consider the exhaustion
question a matter of policy rather than statutory authority.1 6 7 The
court found its interpretation of section 253.763 to be consistent
with the exception to the general policy of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies outlined in Gulf Pines.168 In Gulf Pines, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court upheld circuit court intervention in the admin-
istrative process when a party challenged the constitutionality and
retroactive application of a statute. 6 9 The supreme court con-
cluded that there was no adequate remedy in the administrative
process, and thus additional administrative review would be
"pointless."'' 70
The Gulf Pines exception to the exhaustion doctrine does not
apply to Bowen, because administrative appeal of a permit denial
is not "pointless." In Key Haven the supreme court discussed the
possible outcome that could have resulted from exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies: "[T]he trustees could have offered Key Ha-
ven several possible remedies as a result of the appeal. The trust-
ees could have found the permit denial improper or found a basis
for allowing less extensive development of the land."' ' The precise
remedies which the court outlined as available upon administrative
appeal in Key Haven would have been available in Bowen.172
164. Id. (emphasis in original).
165. Id.
166. Rhodes, supra note 107, at 745 n.30 ("An aggrieved party . . . may wish to forego
an administrative appeal and take an agency's final action directly into the circuit court
alleging a taking."); see also 1 J. JURGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, FLORIDA LAND USE REsTRIc-
TIONS § 2.17 (1984).
167. See, e.g., Gulf Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Memorial Park, Inc., 361 So.
2d 695, 699 (Fla. 1978).
168. Bowen, 448 So. 2d at 569.
169. Gulf Pines, 361 So. 2d at 695.
170. Id. at 699.
171. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 158-59.
172. Indeed, the opportunities for review and modification of the agency action were
greater in Bowen than in Key Haven. In Key Haven, the property owner participated in an
agency hearing with DER but declined to request a hearing before the Governor and the
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The Bowen court cited Key Haven for the proposition that ad-
ministrative remedies need not be exhausted when a party is will-
ing to accept an agency action as correct.17 Key Haven provides
no such exception. Key Haven allows the foregoing of district court
appeal and institution of circuit court action if the party is willing
to accept the action as correct, but only after the party has com-
pleted the administrative process. 17' The only exception to the ex-
haustion rule discussed in Key Haven is a Gulf Pines style chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a statute. 173
The Florida courts have refined the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine in cases considering the power of circuit courts
to issue declaratory judgments provided in chapter 86 of the Flor-
ida Statutes and the role of circuit court declaratory actions in the
context of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act. 176 In State ex
rel. Department of General Services v. Willis 77 the First District
Court of Appeal held that a circuit court injunctive action would
not be heard when the party seeking the injunction had adequate
administrative remedies available under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. The court in Willis described the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies doctrine as a "judicial" rather than a "statutory"
device, 1 7 and cited the value of administrative hearings under the
Act as "serv[ing] the public interest by providing a forum to ex-
pose, inform and challenge agency policy and discretion. 179
The Florida Supreme Court in Gulf Pines and Key Haven re-
stated the position that judicial "policy" requires circuit court re-
straint in interfering with administrative action. 80 In Key Haven,
the court stated that "the determination of whether a particular
controversy may be taken out of the administrative process and
into a circuit court is a question of judicial policy and not a matter
of judicial jurisdiction."'"'
Cabinet acting as Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d
at 155. In Bowen, the appellant declined to request a hearing with DER, foreclosing two
levels of review: (1) the agency hearing at DER, and (2) an appeal to the Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund. Bowen, 448 So. 2d at 568.
173. Bowen, 448 So. 2d at 569.
174. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 159.
175. Id.; see also Smith v. Willis, 415 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
176. State ex rel. Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 586-93 (Fla. 1st DCA
1977); see also School Bd. v. Mitchell, 346 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
177. 344 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
178. Id. at 589.
179. Id. at 591.
180. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 157; Gulf Pines, 361 So. 2d at 699.
181. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 157.
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This policy of judicial 'restraint in what otherwise appears to be
a legislatively created cause of action was criticized by Judge (now
Justice) Shaw of the Second District Court of Appeal in his con-
curring opinion in State Commission on Ethics v. Sullivan:
[Ilt is well established that the wisdom of legislation does not fur-
nish grounds for judicial challenge of the legislation, and there is
no question that the legislature has the constitutional power to
grant such remedies and to assign the concomitant jurisdictional
power to the circuit courts. . . . I have misgivings about the
power of the judiciary to limit statutorily-granted remedies, or
the wisdom of doing so, assuming we have the power." 2
While Justice Shaw questioned the propriety of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, he acknowledged that "it is
[the] body of controlling case law.' 81 3 Florida appellate courts have
limited the ability of circuit courts to entertain declaratory actions,
despite broadly worded statutory and constitutional grants of au-
thority."8 Similarly, in Key Haven, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted a doctrine restricting the actions that a circuit court may
take by requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The
Bowen court based its interpretation of section 253.763 on the
meaning of "final action of an agency," a term left undefined in
section 253.763, Florida Statutes." 5 The court chose to define "fi-
nal agency action" as synonomous with "final order" in section
120.59(1)(c)."'I Because a "final order" may be issued by an agency
pursuant to section 120.59(1)(c) without a hearing, the court con-
cluded that "Chapter 120 does not require a 120.57 hearing before
final agency action."' 7 Given the policy regarding exhaustion of
remedies as enunciated in Key Haven, a final agency action could
have been defined by the Bowen court as a section 120.59(1) final
order issued after the exercise of all available administrative ap-
peals. However, the Bowen court held instead that the "final
agency action" of section 253.763 is not synonymous with the "ex-
haustion of administrative remedies" set forth in Key Haven.'
182. State Comm'n on Ethics v. Sullivan, 430 So. 2d 928, 940 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (Shaw,
J., concurring).
183. Id.
184. FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1983); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
185. Bowen, 448 So. 2d at 569.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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The Florida Supreme Court in its review of Bowen is faced with
the choice of restating exhaustion doctrine as established in Key
Haven or abandoning the exhaustion requirement in light of the
wording of section 253.763. Since chapter 78-85 provides a statu-
tory taking remedy that encompasses Florida's major environmen-
tal permitting programs, the court in Bowen may settle the ex-
haustion question as it relates to taking claims based on the
permitting actions of state agencies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court in National Bulk Carriers rejected a
taking claim based on local zoning action. The court stated a clear
rule that the only remedy for impermissible zoning is invalidation.
In contrast, the judicial response to the procedural issues arising
out of state permit denial can best be described as muddled.
The supreme court in Key Haven urged a policy of judicial re-
straint and the promotion of judicial and administrative efficiency
in requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
raising a taking claim. In contrast, the same court in Albrecht pro-
moted an archaic res judicata formula which results in judicial
inefficiency by allowing a property owner to challenge the propri-
ety of an agency action in district court and subsequently raise a
taking claim in circuit court.
The legislative taking remedy for state permitting action, chap-
ter 78-85, Laws of Florida, does not contain specific requirements
for the exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to raising a cir-
cuit court taking claim. The Second District Court of Appeal in
Bowen ignored the exhaustion policy established by the supreme
court in Key Haven and interpreted chapter 78-85 as allowing a
circuit court taking action without the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. The Florida Supreme Court in Bowen has the op-
portunity to clarify the Key Haven exhaustion rule in light of
chapter 78-85 and establish a predictable process by which to raise
a taking claim.
